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Civil Rights Act of 1964

42 USC CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS

TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS

SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES   

Sec.
2000e.    Definitions.
2000e-1.    Applicability to foreign and religious employment.
2000e-2.    Unlawful employment practices.
2000e-3.    Other unlawful employment practices.
2000e-4.    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
2000e-5.    Enforcement provisions.
2000e-6.    Civil actions by the Attorney General.
2000e-7.    Effect on State laws.
2000e-8.    Investigations.
2000e-9.    Conduct of hearings and investigations pursuant to
                     section 161 of title 29.
2000e-10.   Posting of notices; penalties.
2000e-11.   Veterans' special rights or preference.
2000e-12.   Regulations; conformity of regulations with
                     administrative procedure provisions; reliance on
                     interpretations and instructions of Commission.
2000e-13.   Application to personnel of Commission of sections
                     111 and 1114 of title 18; punishment for
                     violation of section 1114 of title 18.
2000e-14.   Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council;
                     establishment; composition; duties; report to
                     President and Congress.
2000e-15.   Presidential conferences; acquaintance of
                     leadership with provisions for employment rights
                     and obligations; plans for fair administration;
                     membership.
2000e-16.   Employment by Federal Government.
2000e-16a.  Short title; purpose; definition.
2000e-16b.  Discriminatory practices prohibited.
2000e-16c.  Coverage of previously exempt State employees.
2000e-17.   Procedure for denial, withholding, termination, or
                     suspension of Government contract subsequent to
                     acceptance by Government of affirmative action
                     plan of employer; time of acceptance of plan.    

Sec. 2000e. Definitions

      For the purposes of this subchapter -
        (a) The term "person" includes one or more individuals,
      governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor
      unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
      representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts,
      unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under
      title 11, or receivers.
        (b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry
      affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
      working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
      current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
      person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a
      corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States,
      an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of
      Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive
      service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona
      fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)
      which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26,
      except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons
      having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall
      not be considered employers.
        (c) The term "employment agency" means any person regularly
      undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for
      an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for
      an employer and includes an agent of such a person.
        (d) The term "labor organization" means a labor organization
      engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such
      an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any
      agency, or employee representation committee, group, association,
      or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which
      exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
      employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
      pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any
      conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint
      council so engaged which is subordinate to a national or
      international labor organization.
        (e) A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an
      industry affecting commerce if (1) it maintains or operates a
      hiring hall or hiring office which procures employees for an
      employer or procures for employees opportunities to work for an
      employer, or (2) the number of its members (or, where it is a
      labor organization composed of other labor organizations or their
      representatives, if the aggregate number of the members of such
      other labor organization) is (A) twenty-five or more during the
      first year after March 24, 1972, or (B) fifteen or more
      thereafter, and such labor organization -
          (1) is the certified representative of employees under the
        provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended [29
        U.S.C. 151 et seq.], or the Railway Labor Act, as amended [45
        U.S.C. 151 et seq.];
          (2) although not certified, is a national or international
        labor organization or a local labor organization recognized or
        acting as the representative of employees of an employer or
        employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce; or
          (3) has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary
        body which is representing or actively seeking to represent
        employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or
        (2); or
          (4) has been chartered by a labor organization representing
        or actively seeking to represent employees within the meaning
        of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local or subordinate body
        through which such employees may enjoy membership or become
        affiliated with such labor organization; or
          (5) is a conference, general committee, joint or system
        board, or joint council subordinate to a national or
        international labor organization, which includes a labor
        organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce within
        the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this
        subsection.

        (f) The term "employee" means an individual employed by an
      employer, except that the term "employee" shall not include any
      person elected to public office in any State or political
      subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any
      person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal
      staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate
      adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or
      legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the
      preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the
      civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or
      political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign
      country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the
      United States.
        (g) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce,
      transportation, transmission, or communication among the several
      States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or
      within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United
      States; or between points in the same State but through a point
      outside thereof.
        (h) The term "industry affecting commerce" means any activity,
      business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute
      would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce
      and includes any activity or industry "affecting commerce" within
      the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
      of 1959 [29 U.S.C. 401 et seq.], and further includes any
      governmental industry, business, or activity.
        (i) The term "State" includes a State of the United States, the
      District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American
      Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental
      Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act [43
      U.S.C. 1331 et seq.].
        (j) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious
      observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
      demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
      employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
      practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
      business.
        (k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
      include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
      pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women
      affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
      shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
      including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
      other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
      inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this
      title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection
      shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance
      benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would
      be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where
      medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided,
      That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing
      abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in
      regard to abortion.
        (l) The term "complaining party" means the Commission, the
      Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or
      proceeding under this subchapter.
        (m) The term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of
      production and persuasion.
        (n) The term "respondent" means an employer, employment agency,
      labor organization, joint labor-management committee controlling
      apprenticeship or other training or retraining program, including
      an on-the-job training program, or Federal entity subject to
      section 2000e-16 of this title.

Sec. 2000e-1. Applicability to foreign and religious employment

    (a) Inapplicability of subchapter to certain aliens and employees
      of religious entities
      This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to
    the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious
    corporation, association, educational institution, or society with
    respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
    to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
    association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
    (b) Compliance with statute as violative of foreign law
      It shall not be unlawful under section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this
    title for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an employer),
    labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management
    committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
    retraining (including on-the-job training programs) to take any
    action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an
    employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with
    such section would cause such employer (or such corporation), such
    organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of
    the foreign country in which such workplace is located.
    (c) Control of corporation incorporated in foreign country
      (1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of
    incorporation is a foreign country, any practice prohibited by
    section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title engaged in by such
    corporation shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer.
      (2) Sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 of this title shall not apply
    with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is a
    foreign person not controlled by an American employer.
      (3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination of whether
    an employer controls a corporation shall be based on -
        (A) the interrelation of operations;
        (B) the common management;
        (C) the centralized control of labor relations; and
        (D) the common ownership or financial control,

    of the employer and the corporation.

Sec. 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices

    (a) Employer practices
      It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
        (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
      or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
      to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
      employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
      sex, or national origin; or
        (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
      applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
      to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
      otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
      such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
    (b) Employment agency practices
      It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment
    agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to
    discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color,
    religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for
    employment any individual on the basis of his race, color,
    religion, sex, or national origin.
    (c) Labor organization practices
      It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor
    organization -
        (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
      discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color,
      religion, sex, or national origin;
        (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or
      applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to
      refer for employment any individual, in any way which would
      deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
      opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or
      otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an
      applicant for employment, because of such individual's race,
      color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
        (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
      against an individual in violation of this section.
    (d) Training programs
      It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer,
    labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling
    apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including
    on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual
    because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
    admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide
    apprenticeship or other training.
    (e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of
      religion, sex, or national origin; educational institutions with
      personnel of particular religion
      Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it
    shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
    hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or
    refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to
    classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any
    individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint
    labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
    training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual
    in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
    origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
    origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
    necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
    enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
    for a school, college, university, or other educational institution
    or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a
    particular religion if such school, college, university, or other
    educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or
    in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
    particular religion or by a particular religious corporation,
    association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school,
    college, university, or other educational institution or
    institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a
    particular religion.
    (f) Members of Communist Party or Communist-action or
      Communist-front organizations
      As used in this subchapter, the phrase "unlawful employment
    practice" shall not be deemed to include any action or measure
    taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management
    committee, or employment agency with respect to an individual who
    is a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any
    other organization required to register as a Communist-action or
    Communist-front organization by final order of the Subversive
    Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities
    Control Act of 1950 [50 U.S.C. 781 et seq.].
    (g) National security
      Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
    not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
    refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an
    employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an
    employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for
    employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or
    refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if -

        (1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises
      in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is
      performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement
      imposed in the interest of the national security of the United
      States under any security program in effect pursuant to or
      administered under any statute of the United States or any
      Executive order of the President; and
        (2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill
      that requirement.
    (h) Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production;
      ability tests; compensation based on sex and authorized by
      minimum wage provisions
      Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
    not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
    different standards of compensation, or different terms,
    conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
    seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by
    quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in
    different locations, provided that such differences are not the
    result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
    religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful
    employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the
    results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
    such test, its administration or action upon the results is not
    designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color,
    religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful
    employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to
    differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of
    the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such
    employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of
    section 206(d) of title 29.
    (i) Businesses or enterprises extending preferential treatment to
      Indians
      Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business
    or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any
    publicly announced employment practice of such business or
    enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any
    individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.
    (j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing
      number or percentage imbalance
      Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
    require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
    joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to
    grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
    because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
    such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
    with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any
    race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any
    employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment
    agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified
    by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any
    apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the
    total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
    religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
    or other area, or in the available work force in any community,
    State, section, or other area.
    (k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
      (1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact
    is established under this subchapter only if -
        (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
      particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on
      the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
      the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice
      is job related for the position in question and consistent with
      business necessity; or
        (ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
      subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
      practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
      employment practice.

      (B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment
    practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph
    (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each
    particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate
    impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the
    court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process
    are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking
    process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
      (ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment
    practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall
    not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by
    business necessity.
      (C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall
    be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with
    respect to the concept of "alternative employment practice".
      (2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by
    business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of
    intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
      (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a
    rule barring the employment of an individual who currently and
    knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in
    schedules I and II of section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances
    Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession of a drug
    taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional,
    or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled
    Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.] or any other provision of
    Federal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice
    under this subchapter only if such rule is adopted or applied with
    an intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
    national origin.
    (l) Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores
      It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in
    connection with the selection or referral of applicants or
    candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of,
    use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of,
    employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion,
    sex, or national origin.
    (m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or
      national origin in employment practices
      Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful
    employment practice is established when the complaining party
    demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
    was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
    other factors also motivated the practice.
    (n) Resolution of challenges to employment practices implementing
      litigated or consent judgments or orders
      (1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as
    provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that implements
    and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order
    that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the
    Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged
    under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).
      (B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be
    challenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil
    rights laws -
        (i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or
      order described in subparagraph (A), had -
          (I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order
        sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or order
        might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such
        person and that an opportunity was available to present
        objections to such judgment or order by a future date certain;
        and
          (II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such
        judgment or order; or

        (ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by
      another person who had previously challenged the judgment or
      order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual
      situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or
      fact.

      (2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to -
        (A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the
      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of
      parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in
      the proceeding in which the parties intervened;
        (B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a
      litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of members
      of a class represented or sought to be represented in such
      action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was
      sought in such action by the Federal Government;
        (C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or
      order on the ground that such judgment or order was obtained
      through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was
      entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or
        (D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due
      process of law required by the Constitution.

      (3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that
    challenges an employment consent judgment or order described in
    paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before
    the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this
    subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action pursuant to
    section 1404 of title 28.

Sec. 2000e-3. Other unlawful employment practices

    (a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or
      participating in enforcement proceedings
      It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
    discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
    employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management
    committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
    retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate
    against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
    against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he
    has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
    this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
    assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
    proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
    (b) Printing or publication of notices or advertisements indicating
      prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or
      discrimination; occupational qualification exception
      It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer,
    labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management
    committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
    retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or
    publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or
    advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or
    membership in or any classification or referral for employment by
    such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or
    referral for employment by such an employment agency, or relating
    to admission to, or employment in, any program established to
    provide apprenticeship or other training by such a joint
    labor-management committee, indicating any preference, limitation,
    specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion,
    sex, or national origin, except that such a notice or advertisement
    may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or
    discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when
    religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
    qualification for employment.

Sec. 2000e-4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

    (a) Creation; composition; political representation; appointment;
      term; vacancies; Chairman and Vice Chairman; duties of Chairman;
      appointment of personnel; compensation of personnel
      There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission, which shall be composed of five
    members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same
    political party. Members of the Commission shall be appointed by
    the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate for
    a term of five years. Any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall
    be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom he
    shall succeed, and all members of the Commission shall continue to
    serve until their successors are appointed and qualified, except
    that no such member of the Commission shall continue to serve (1)
    for more than sixty days when the Congress is in session unless a
    nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted to the
    Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the
    Senate in which such nomination was submitted. The President shall
    designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Commission, and
    one member to serve as Vice Chairman. The Chairman shall be
    responsible on behalf of the Commission for the administrative
    operations of the Commission, and, except as provided in subsection
    (b) of this section, shall appoint, in accordance with the
    provisions of title 5 governing appointments in the competitive
    service, such officers, agents, attorneys, administrative law
    judges, and employees as he deems necessary to assist it in the
    performance of its functions and to fix their compensation in
    accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of
    chapter 53 of title 5, relating to classification and General
    Schedule pay rates: Provided, That assignment, removal, and
    compensation of administrative law judges shall be in accordance
    with sections 3105, 3344, 5372, and 7521 of title 5.
    (b) General Counsel; appointment; term; duties; representation by
      attorneys and Attorney General
      (1) There shall be a General Counsel of the Commission appointed
    by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
    for a term of four years. The General Counsel shall have
    responsibility for the conduct of litigation as provided in
    sections 2000e-5 and 2000e-6 of this title. The General Counsel
    shall have such other duties as the Commission may prescribe or as
    may be provided by law and shall concur with the Chairman of the
    Commission on the appointment and supervision of regional
    attorneys. The General Counsel of the Commission on the effective
    date of this Act shall continue in such position and perform the
    functions specified in this subsection until a successor is
    appointed and qualified.
      (2) Attorneys appointed under this section may, at the direction
    of the Commission, appear for and represent the Commission in any
    case in court, provided that the Attorney General shall conduct all
    litigation to which the Commission is a party in the Supreme Court
    pursuant to this subchapter.
    (c) Exercise of powers during vacancy; quorum
      A vacancy in the Commission shall not impair the right of the
    remaining members to exercise all the powers of the Commission and
    three members thereof shall constitute a quorum.
    (d) Seal; judicial notice
      The Commission shall have an official seal which shall be
    judicially noticed.
    (e) Reports to Congress and the President
      The Commission shall at the close of each fiscal year report to
    the Congress and to the President concerning the action it has
    taken and the moneys it has disbursed. It shall make such further
    reports on the cause of and means of eliminating discrimination and
    such recommendations for further legislation as may appear
    desirable.
    (f) Principal and other offices
      The principal office of the Commission shall be in or near the
    District of Columbia, but it may meet or exercise any or all its
    powers at any other place. The Commission may establish such
    regional or State offices as it deems necessary to accomplish the
    purpose of this subchapter.
    (g) Powers of Commission
      The Commission shall have power -
        (1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize
      regional, State, local, and other agencies, both public and
      private, and individuals;
        (2) to pay to witnesses whose depositions are taken or who are
      summoned before the Commission or any of its agents the same
      witness and mileage fees as are paid to witnesses in the courts
      of the United States;
        (3) to furnish to persons subject to this subchapter such
      technical assistance as they may request to further their
      compliance with this subchapter or an order issued thereunder;
        (4) upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees or
      some of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose members or
      some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in
      effectuating the provisions of this subchapter, to assist in such
      effectuation by conciliation or such other remedial action as is
      provided by this subchapter;
        (5) to make such technical studies as are appropriate to
      effectuate the purposes and policies of this subchapter and to
      make the results of such studies available to the public;
        (6) to intervene in a civil action brought under section
      2000e-5 of this title by an aggrieved party against a respondent
      other than a government, governmental agency or political
      subdivision.
    (h) Cooperation with other departments and agencies in performance
      of educational or promotional activities; outreach activities
      (1) The Commission shall, in any of its educational or
    promotional activities, cooperate with other departments and
    agencies in the performance of such educational and promotional
    activities.
      (2) In exercising its powers under this subchapter, the
    Commission shall carry out educational and outreach activities
    (including dissemination of information in languages other than
    English) targeted to -
        (A) individuals who historically have been victims of
      employment discrimination and have not been equitably served by
      the Commission; and
        (B) individuals on whose behalf the Commission has authority to
      enforce any other law prohibiting employment discrimination,

    concerning rights and obligations under this subchapter or such
    law, as the case may be.
    (i) Personnel subject to political activity restrictions
      All officers, agents, attorneys, and employees of the Commission
    shall be subject to the provisions of section 7324 )1(! of title 5,
    notwithstanding any exemption contained in such section.

    (j) Technical Assistance Training Institute
      (1) The Commission shall establish a Technical Assistance
    Training Institute, through which the Commission shall provide
    technical assistance and training regarding the laws and
    regulations enforced by the Commission.
      (2) An employer or other entity covered under this subchapter
    shall not be excused from compliance with the requirements of this
    subchapter because of any failure to receive technical assistance
    under this subsection.
      (3) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this
    subsection such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1992.
    (k) EEOC Education, Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving
      Fund
      (1) There is hereby established in the Treasury of the United
    States a revolving fund to be known as the "EEOC Education,
    Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving Fund" (hereinafter in
    this subsection referred to as the "Fund") and to pay the cost
    (including administrative and personnel expenses) of providing
    education, technical assistance, and training relating to laws
    administered by the Commission. Monies in the Fund shall be
    available without fiscal year limitation to the Commission for such
    purposes.
      (2)(A) The Commission shall charge fees in accordance with the
    provisions of this paragraph to offset the costs of education,
    technical assistance, and training provided with monies in the
    Fund. Such fees for any education, technical assistance, or
    training -
        (i) shall be imposed on a uniform basis on persons and entities
      receiving such education, assistance, or training,
        (ii) shall not exceed the cost of providing such education,
      assistance, and training, and
        (iii) with respect to each person or entity receiving such
      education, assistance, or training, shall bear a reasonable
      relationship to the cost of providing such education, assistance,
      or training to such person or entity.

      (B) Fees received under subparagraph (A) shall be deposited in
    the Fund by the Commission.
      (C) The Commission shall include in each report made under
    subsection (e) of this section information with respect to the
    operation of the Fund, including information, presented in the
    aggregate, relating to -
        (i) the number of persons and entities to which the Commission
      provided education, technical assistance, or training with monies
      in the Fund, in the fiscal year for which such report is
      prepared,
        (ii) the cost to the Commission to provide such education,
      technical assistance, or training to such persons and entities,
      and
        (iii) the amount of any fees received by the Commission from
      such persons and entities for such education, technical
      assistance, or training.

      (3) The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the portion of the
    Fund not required to satisfy current expenditures from the Fund, as
    determined by the Commission, in obligations of the United States
    or obligations guaranteed as to principal by the United States.
    Investment proceeds shall be deposited in the Fund.
      (4) There is hereby transferred to the Fund $1,000,000 from the
    Salaries and Expenses appropriation of the Commission.

Sec. 2000e-5. Enforcement provisions

    (a) Power of Commission to prevent unlawful employment practices
      The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent
    any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set
    forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title.
    (b) Charges by persons aggrieved or member of Commission of
      unlawful employment practices by employers, etc.; filing;
      allegations; notice to respondent; contents of notice;
      investigation by Commission; contents of charges; prohibition on
      disclosure of charges; determination of reasonable cause;
      conference, conciliation, and persuasion for elimination of
      unlawful practices; prohibition on disclosure of informal
      endeavors to end unlawful practices; use of evidence in
      subsequent proceedings; penalties for disclosure of information;
      time for determination of reasonable cause
      Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming
    to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an
    employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
    labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
    training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, has
    engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall
    serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and
    circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on such
    employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
    labor-management committee (hereinafter referred to as the
    "respondent") within ten days, and shall make an investigation
    thereof. Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and
    shall contain such information and be in such form as the
    Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the
    Commission. If the Commission determines after such investigation
    that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
    true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person
    claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action. In
    determining whether reasonable cause exists, the Commission shall
    accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by
    State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or
    local law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and (d)
    of this section. If the Commission determines after such
    investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
    charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
    alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
    conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done
    during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public
    by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence
    in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the
    persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in
    violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
    imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. The Commission
    shall make its determination on reasonable cause as promptly as
    possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and
    twenty days from the filing of the charge or, where applicable
    under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, from the date upon
    which the Commission is authorized to take action with respect to
    the charge.
    (c) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State
      or local authority; time for filing charges with Commission;
      commencement of proceedings
      In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring
    in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State
    or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged
    and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant
    or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
    proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no
    charge may be filed under subsection (a) )1(! of this section by
    the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after
    proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law,
    unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that
    such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty
    days during the first year after the effective date of such State
    or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such
    proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a
    requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the
    facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be
    deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection
    at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the
    appropriate State or local authority.

    (d) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State
      or local authority; time for action on charges by Commission
      In the case of any charge filed by a member of the Commission
    alleging an unlawful employment practice occurring in a State or
    political subdivision of a State which has a State or local law
    prohibiting the practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a
    State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice
    or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon
    receiving notice thereof, the Commission shall, before taking any
    action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or
    local officials and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time,
    but not less than sixty days (provided that such sixty-day period
    shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first
    year after the effective day of such State or local law), unless a
    shorter period is requested, to act under such State or local law
    to remedy the practice alleged.
    (e) Time for filing charges; time for service of notice of charge
      on respondent; filing of charge by Commission with State or local
      agency; seniority system
      (1) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred
    and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
    occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and
    circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be
    served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten
    days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment
    practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially
    instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority
    to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
    proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof,
    such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved
    within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
    practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice
    that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under
    the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such
    charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local
    agency.
      (2) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice
    occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been adopted
    for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this
    subchapter (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent
    on the face of the seniority provision), when the seniority system
    is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority
    system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of
    the seniority system or provision of the system.
    (f) Civil action by Commission, Attorney General, or person
      aggrieved; preconditions; procedure; appointment of attorney;
      payment of fees, costs, or security; intervention; stay of
      Federal proceedings; action for appropriate temporary or
      preliminary relief pending final disposition of charge;
      jurisdiction and venue of United States courts; designation of
      judge to hear and determine case; assignment of case for hearing;
      expedition of case; appointment of master
      (1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the
    Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of
    reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the
    Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a
    conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission
    may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government,
    governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge.
    In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental
    agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable
    to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable
    to the Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and
    shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil
    action against such respondent in the appropriate United States
    district court. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the
    right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or
    the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental
    agency, or political subdivision. If a charge filed with the
    Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, is dismissed
    by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from
    the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of
    reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is
    later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this
    section or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a
    case involving a government, governmental agency, or political
    subdivision, or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation
    agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission,
    or the Attorney General in a case involving a government,
    governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the
    person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such
    notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named
    in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if
    such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person
    whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful
    employment practice. Upon application by the complainant and in
    such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may
    appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the
    commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or
    security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its
    discretion, permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a
    case involving a government, governmental agency, or political
    subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon certification
    that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the
    court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more
    than sixty days pending the termination of State or local
    proceedings described in subsection (c) or (d) of this section or
    further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.
      (2) Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the
    Commission concludes on the basis of a preliminary investigation
    that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes
    of this Act, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case
    involving a government, governmental agency, or political
    subdivision, may bring an action for appropriate temporary or
    preliminary relief pending final disposition of such charge. Any
    temporary restraining order or other order granting preliminary or
    temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It shall be the duty of a court
    having jurisdiction over proceedings under this section to assign
    cases for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause
    such cases to be in every way expedited.
      (3) Each United States district court and each United States
    court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
    shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.
    Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State
    in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been
    committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records
    relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in
    the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have
    worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the
    respondent is not found within any such district, such an action
    may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent
    has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of
    title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his
    principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in
    which the action might have been brought.
      (4) It shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or
    in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is
    pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear
    and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the district
    is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the
    district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall
    certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his
    absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a
    district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the
    case.
      (5) It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this
    subsection to assign the case for hearing at the earliest
    practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way
    expedited. If such judge has not scheduled the case for trial
    within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined,
    that judge may appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure.
    (g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief;
      accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on
      judicial orders
      (1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
    engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
    practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
    respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
    order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
    include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
    employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
    employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be,
    responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
    equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability
    shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the
    filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts
    earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons
    discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay
    otherwise allowable.
      (2)(A) No order of the court shall require the admission or
    reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the
    hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
    employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual
    was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused
    employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any
    reason other than discrimination on account of race, color,
    religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section
    2000e-3(a) of this title.
      (B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under
    section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that
    the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of
    the impermissible motivating factor, the court -
        (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as
      provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs
      demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
      claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
        (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
      admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment,
      described in subparagraph (A).
    (h) Provisions of chapter 6 of title 29 not applicable to civil
      actions for prevention of unlawful practices
      The provisions of chapter 6 of title 29 shall not apply with
    respect to civil actions brought under this section.
    (i) Proceedings by Commission to compel compliance with judicial
      orders
      In any case in which an employer, employment agency, or labor
    organization fails to comply with an order of a court issued in a
    civil action brought under this section, the Commission may
    commence proceedings to compel compliance with such order.
    (j) Appeals
      Any civil action brought under this section and any proceedings
    brought under subsection (i) of this section shall be subject to
    appeal as provided in sections 1291 and 1292, title 28.
    (k) Attorney's fee; liability of Commission and United States for
      costs
      In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in
    its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
    Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
    (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission
    and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a
    private person.

)1(! So in original. Probably should be subsection "(b)".

Sec. 2000e-6. Civil actions by the Attorney General

    (a) Complaint
      Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
    that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or
    practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
    secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of
    such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the
    rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil
    action in the appropriate district court of the United States by
    filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence the
    Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to
    such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including
    an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
    order or other order against the person or persons responsible for
    such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full
    enjoyment of the rights herein described.
    (b) Jurisdiction; three-judge district court for cases of general
      public importance: hearing, determination, expedition of action,
      review by Supreme Court; single judge district court: hearing,
      determination, expedition of action
      The district courts of the United States shall have and shall
    exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this
    section, and in any such proceeding the Attorney General may file
    with the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges
    be convened to hear and determine the case. Such request by the
    Attorney General shall be accompanied by a certificate that, in his
    opinion, the case is of general public importance. A copy of the
    certificate and request for a three-judge court shall be
    immediately furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the
    circuit (or in his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the
    circuit) in which the case is pending. Upon receipt of such request
    it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the circuit or the
    presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate
    immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one
    shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district
    judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear
    and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so
    designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest
    practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination
    thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An
    appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the
    Supreme Court.
      In the event the Attorney General fails to file such a request in
    any such proceeding, it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the
    district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the
    case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district
    to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the
    district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief
    judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may
    be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or
    in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a
    district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the
    case.
      It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this
    section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable
    date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.
    (c) Transfer of functions, etc., to Commission; effective date;
      prerequisite to transfer; execution of functions by Commission
      Effective two years after March 24, 1972, the functions of the
    Attorney General under this section shall be transferred to the
    Commission, together with such personnel, property, records, and
    unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds
    employed, used, held, available, or to be made available in
    connection with such functions unless the President submits, and
    neither House of Congress vetoes, a reorganization plan pursuant to
    chapter 9 of title 5, inconsistent with the provisions of this
    subsection. The Commission shall carry out such functions in
    accordance with subsections (d) and (e) of this section.
    (d) Transfer of functions, etc., not to affect suits commenced
      pursuant to this section prior to date of transfer
      Upon the transfer of functions provided for in subsection (c) of
    this section, in all suits commenced pursuant to this section prior
    to the date of such transfer, proceedings shall continue without
    abatement, all court orders and decrees shall remain in effect, and
    the Commission shall be substituted as a party for the United
    States of America, the Attorney General, or the Acting Attorney
    General, as appropriate.
    (e) Investigation and action by Commission pursuant to filing of
      charge of discrimination; procedure
      Subsequent to March 24, 1972, the Commission shall have authority
    to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of
    discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of a person claiming
    to be aggrieved or by a member of the Commission. All such actions
    shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in
    section 2000e-5 of this title.

Sec. 2000e-7. Effect on State laws

      Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve
    any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment
    provided by any present or future law of any State or political
    subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to
    require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
    employment practice under this subchapter.

Sec. 2000e-8. Investigations

    (a) Examination and copying of evidence related to unlawful
      employment practices
      In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under
    section 2000e-5 of this title, the Commission or its designated
    representative shall at all reasonable times have access to, for
    the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of
    any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to
    unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is
    relevant to the charge under investigation.
    (b) Cooperation with State and local agencies administering State
      fair employment practices laws; participation in and contribution
      to research and other projects; utilization of services; payment
      in advance or reimbursement; agreements and rescission of
      agreements
      The Commission may cooperate with State and local agencies
    charged with the administration of State fair employment practices
    laws and, with the consent of such agencies, may, for the purpose
    of carrying out its functions and duties under this subchapter and
    within the limitation of funds appropriated specifically for such
    purpose, engage in and contribute to the cost of research and other
    projects of mutual interest undertaken by such agencies, and
    utilize the services of such agencies and their employees, and,
    notwithstanding any other provision of law, pay by advance or
    reimbursement such agencies and their employees for services
    rendered to assist the Commission in carrying out this subchapter.
    In furtherance of such cooperative efforts, the Commission may
    enter into written agreements with such State or local agencies and
    such agreements may include provisions under which the Commission
    shall refrain from processing a charge in any cases or class of
    cases specified in such agreements or under which the Commission
    shall relieve any person or class of persons in such State or
    locality from requirements imposed under this section. The
    Commission shall rescind any such agreement whenever it determines
    that the agreement no longer serves the interest of effective
    enforcement of this subchapter.
    (c) Execution, retention, and preservation of records; reports to
      Commission; training program records; appropriate relief from
      regulation or order for undue hardship; procedure for exemption;
      judicial action to compel compliance
      Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization subject
    to this subchapter shall (1) make and keep such records relevant to
    the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have
    been or are being committed, (2) preserve such records for such
    periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom as the Commission
    shall prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as
    reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for the enforcement of this
    subchapter or the regulations or orders thereunder. The Commission
    shall, by regulation, require each employer, labor organization,
    and joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter
    which controls an apprenticeship or other training program to
    maintain such records as are reasonably necessary to carry out the
    purposes of this subchapter, including, but not limited to, a list
    of applicants who wish to participate in such program, including
    the chronological order in which applications were received, and to
    furnish to the Commission upon request, a detailed description of
    the manner in which persons are selected to participate in the
    apprenticeship or other training program. Any employer, employment
    agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
    which believes that the application to it of any regulation or
    order issued under this section would result in undue hardship may
    apply to the Commission for an exemption from the application of
    such regulation or order, and, if such application for an exemption
    is denied, bring a civil action in the United States district court
    for the district where such records are kept. If the Commission or
    the court, as the case may be, finds that the application of the
    regulation or order to the employer, employment agency, or labor
    organization in question would impose an undue hardship, the
    Commission or the court, as the case may be, may grant appropriate
    relief. If any person required to comply with the provisions of
    this subsection fails or refuses to do so, the United States
    district court for the district in which such person is found,
    resides, or transacts business, shall, upon application of the
    Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a
    government, governmental agency or political subdivision, have
    jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring him to
    comply.
    (d) Consultation and coordination between Commission and interested
      State and Federal agencies in prescribing recordkeeping and
      reporting requirements; availability of information furnished
      pursuant to recordkeeping and reporting requirements; conditions
      on availability
      In prescribing requirements pursuant to subsection (c) of this
    section, the Commission shall consult with other interested State
    and Federal agencies and shall endeavor to coordinate its
    requirements with those adopted by such agencies. The Commission
    shall furnish upon request and without cost to any State or local
    agency charged with the administration of a fair employment
    practice law information obtained pursuant to subsection (c) of
    this section from any employer, employment agency, labor
    organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to the
    jurisdiction of such agency. Such information shall be furnished on
    condition that it not be made public by the recipient agency prior
    to the institution of a proceeding under State or local law
    involving such information. If this condition is violated by a
    recipient agency, the Commission may decline to honor subsequent
    requests pursuant to this subsection.
    (e) Prohibited disclosures; penalties
      It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the
    Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information
    obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this
    section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this
    subchapter involving such information. Any officer or employee of
    the Commission who shall make public in any manner whatever any
    information in violation of this subsection shall be guilty, of a
    misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
    than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.

Sec. 2000e-9. Conduct of hearings and investigations pursuant to
      section 161 of title 29

      For the purpose of all hearings and investigations conducted by
    the Commission or its duly authorized agents or agencies, section
    161 of title 29 shall apply.

Sec. 2000e-10. Posting of notices; penalties

      (a) Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization, as
    the case may be, shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places
    upon its premises where notices to employees, applicants for
    employment, and members are customarily posted a notice to be
    prepared or approved by the Commission setting forth excerpts, from
    or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this subchapter and
    information pertinent to the filing of a complaint.
      (b) A willful violation of this section shall be punishable by a
    fine of not more than $100 for each separate offense.

Sec. 2000e-11. Veterans' special rights or preference

      Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal
    or modify any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating
    special rights or preference for veterans.

Sec. 2000e-12. Regulations; conformity of regulations with
      administrative procedure provisions; reliance on interpretations
      and instructions of Commission

      (a) The Commission shall have authority from time to time to
    issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry
    out the provisions of this subchapter. Regulations issued under
    this section shall be in conformity with the standards and
    limitations of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5.
      (b) In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful
    employment practice, no person shall be subject to any liability or
    punishment for or on account of (1) the commission by such person
    of an unlawful employment practice if he pleads and proves that the
    act or omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity
    with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of
    the Commission, or (2) the failure of such person to publish and
    file any information required by any provision of this subchapter
    if he pleads and proves that he failed to publish and file such
    information in good faith, in conformity with the instructions of
    the Commission issued under this subchapter regarding the filing of
    such information. Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to
    the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that (A) after such act
    or omission, such interpretation or opinion is modified or
    rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or
    of no legal effect, or (B) after publishing or filing the
    description and annual reports, such publication or filing is
    determined by judicial authority not to be in conformity with the
    requirements of this subchapter.

Sec. 2000e-13. Application to personnel of Commission of sections
      111 and 1114 of title 18; punishment for violation of section
      1114 of title 18

      The provisions of sections 111 and 1114, title 18, shall apply to
    officers, agents, and employees of the Commission in the
    performance of their official duties. Notwithstanding the
    provisions of sections 111 and 1114 of title 18, whoever in
    violation of the provisions of section 1114 of such title kills a
    person while engaged in or on account of the performance of his
    official functions under this Act shall be punished by imprisonment
    for any term of years or for life.

Sec. 2000e-14. Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council;
      establishment; composition; duties; report to President and
      Congress

      The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have the
    responsibility for developing and implementing agreements, policies
    and practices designed to maximize effort, promote efficiency, and
    eliminate conflict, competition, duplication and inconsistency
    among the operations, functions and jurisdictions of the various
    departments, agencies and branches of the Federal Government
    responsible for the implementation and enforcement of equal
    employment opportunity legislation, orders, and policies. On or
    before October 1 of each year, the Equal Employment Opportunity
    Commission shall transmit to the President and to the Congress a
    report of its activities, together with such recommendations for
    legislative or administrative changes as it concludes are desirable
    to further promote the purposes of this section.

Sec. 2000e-15. Presidential conferences; acquaintance of leadership
      with provisions for employment rights and obligations; plans for
      fair administration; membership

      The President shall, as soon as feasible after July 2, 1964,
    convene one or more conferences for the purpose of enabling the
    leaders of groups whose members will be affected by this subchapter
    to become familiar with the rights afforded and obligations imposed
    by its provisions, and for the purpose of making plans which will
    result in the fair and effective administration of this subchapter
    when all of its provisions become effective. The President shall
    invite the participation in such conference or conferences of (1)
    the members of the President's Committee on Equal Employment
    Opportunity, (2) the members of the Commission on Civil Rights, (3)
    representatives of State and local agencies engaged in furthering
    equal employment opportunity, (4) representatives of private
    agencies engaged in furthering equal employment opportunity, and
    (5) representatives of employers, labor organizations, and
    employment agencies who will be subject to this subchapter.

Sec. 2000e-16. Employment by Federal Government

    (a) Discriminatory practices prohibited; employees or applicants
      for employment subject to coverage
      All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
    employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the
    limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in
    section 102 of title 5, in executive agencies as defined in section
    105 of title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment
    who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States
    Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of
    the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the
    competitive service, and in those units of the judicial branch of
    the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service,
    in the Smithsonian Institution, and in the Government Printing
    Office, the General Accounting Office, and the Library of Congress
    shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
    religion, sex, or national origin.
    (b) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; enforcement powers;
      issuance of rules, regulations, etc.; annual review and approval
      of national and regional equal employment opportunity plans;
      review and evaluation of equal employment opportunity programs
      and publication of progress reports; consultations with
      interested parties; compliance with rules, regulations, etc.;
      contents of national and regional equal employment opportunity
      plans; authority of Librarian of Congress
      Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission shall have authority to enforce
    the provisions of subsection (a) of this section through
    appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of
    employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
    of this section, and shall issue such rules, regulations, orders
    and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out
    its responsibilities under this section. The Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission shall -
        (1) be responsible for the annual review and approval of a
      national and regional equal employment opportunity plan which
      each department and agency and each appropriate unit referred to
      in subsection (a) of this section shall submit in order to
      maintain an affirmative program of equal employment opportunity
      for all such employees and applicants for employment;
        (2) be responsible for the review and evaluation of the
      operation of all agency equal employment opportunity programs,
      periodically obtaining and publishing (on at least a semiannual
      basis) progress reports from each such department, agency, or
      unit; and
        (3) consult with and solicit the recommendations of interested
      individuals, groups, and organizations relating to equal
      employment opportunity.

    The head of each such department, agency, or unit shall comply with
    such rules, regulations, orders, and instructions which shall
    include a provision that an employee or applicant for employment
    shall be notified of any final action taken on any complaint of
    discrimination filed by him thereunder. The plan submitted by each
    department, agency, and unit shall include, but not be limited to -

        (1) provision for the establishment of training and education
      programs designed to provide a maximum opportunity for employees
      to advance so as to perform at their highest potential; and
        (2) a description of the qualifications in terms of training
      and experience relating to equal employment opportunity for the
      principal and operating officials of each such department,
      agency, or unit responsible for carrying out the equal employment
      opportunity program and of the allocation of personnel and
      resources proposed by such department, agency, or unit to carry
      out its equal employment opportunity program.

    With respect to employment in the Library of Congress, authorities
    granted in this subsection to the Equal Employment Opportunity
    Commission shall be exercised by the Librarian of Congress.
    (c) Civil action by employee or applicant for employment for
      redress of grievances; time for bringing of action; head of
      department, agency, or unit as defendant
      Within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a
    department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this
    section, or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon an
    appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit
    on a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion,
    sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this
    section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding Executive orders,
    or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial
    charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission on appeal from a decision or
    order of such department, agency, or unit until such time as final
    action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee
    or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition
    of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his
    complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5
    of this title, in which civil action the head of the department,
    agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.
    (d) Section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title applicable to
      civil actions
      The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title,
    as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder, and
    the same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be
    available as in cases involving nonpublic parties..)1(!

    (e) Government agency or official not relieved of responsibility to
      assure nondiscrimination in employment or equal employment
      opportunity
      Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government agency
    or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure
    nondiscrimination in employment as required by the Constitution and
    statutes or of its or his responsibilities under Executive Order
    11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the Federal
    Government.

1 So in original.

Sec. 2000e-16a. Short title; purpose; definition

    (a) Short title
      Sections 2000e-16a to 2000e-16c of this title may be cited as the
    "Government Employee Rights Act of 1991".
    (b) Purpose
      The purpose of sections 2000e-16a to 2000e-16c of this title is
    to provide procedures to protect the rights of certain government
    employees, with respect to their public employment, to be free of
    discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national
    origin, age, or disability.
    (c) "Violation" defined
      For purposes of sections 2000e-16a to 2000e-16c of this title,
    the term "violation" means a practice that violates section
    2000e-16b(a) of this title.

Sec. 2000e-16b. Discriminatory practices prohibited

    (a) Practices
      All personnel actions affecting the Presidential appointees
    described in section 1219 )1(! of title 2 or the State employees
    described in section 2000e-16c of this title shall be made free
    from any discrimination based on - 

        (1) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, within the
      meaning of section 2000e-16 of this title;
        (2) age, within the meaning of section 633a of title 29; or
        (3) disability, within the meaning of section 791 of title 29
      and sections 12112 to 12114 of this title.
    (b) Remedies
      The remedies referred to in sections 1219(a)(1) )1(! of title 2
    and 2000e-16c(a) of this title -
        (1) may include, in the case of a determination that a
      violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3) of this section has
      occurred, such remedies as would be appropriate if awarded under
      sections 2000e-5(g), 2000e-5(k), and 2000e-16(d) of this title,
      and such compensatory damages as would be appropriate if awarded
      under section 1981 or sections 1981a(a) and 1981a(b)(2) of this
      title;
        (2) may include, in the case of a determination that a
      violation of subsection (a)(2) of this section has occurred, such
      remedies as would be appropriate if awarded under section 633a(c)
      of title 29; and
        (3) may not include punitive damages.

Sec. 2000e-16c. Coverage of previously exempt State employees

    (a) Application
      The rights, protections, and remedies provided pursuant to
    section 2000e-16b of this title shall apply with respect to
    employment of any individual chosen or appointed, by a person
    elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of
    any State by the qualified voters thereof -
        (1) to be a member of the elected official's personal staff;
        (2) to serve the elected official on the policymaking level; or
        (3) to serve the elected official as an immediate advisor with
      respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of
      the office.
    (b) Enforcement by administrative action
      (1) In general
        Any individual referred to in subsection (a) of this section
      may file a complaint alleging a violation, not later than 180
      days after the occurrence of the alleged violation, with the
      Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which, in accordance
      with the principles and procedures set forth in sections 554
      through 557 of title 5, shall determine whether a violation has
      occurred and shall set forth its determination in a final order.
      If the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determines that a
      violation has occurred, the final order shall also provide for
      appropriate relief.
      (2) Referral to State and local authorities
        (A) Application
          Section 2000e-5(d) of this title shall apply with respect to
        any proceeding under this section.
        (B) Definition
          For purposes of the application described in subparagraph
        (A), the term "any charge filed by a member of the Commission
        alleging an unlawful employment practice" means a complaint
        filed under this section.
    (c) Judicial review
      Any party aggrieved by a final order under subsection (b) of this
    section may obtain a review of such order under chapter 158 of
    title 28. For the purpose of this review, the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission shall be an "agency" as that term is used in
    chapter 158 of title 28.
    (d) Standard of review
      To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
    reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law and
    interpret constitutional and statutory provisions. The court shall
    set aside a final order under subsection (b) of this section if it
    is determined that the order was -
        (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
      not consistent with law;
        (2) not made consistent with required procedures; or
        (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.

    In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the
    whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account
    shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
    (e) Attorney's fees
      If the individual referred to in subsection (a) of this section
    is the prevailing party in a proceeding under this subsection,)1(!
    attorney's fees may be allowed by the court in accordance with the
    standards prescribed under section 2000e-5(k) of this title.

1 So in original.

Sec. 2000e-17. Procedure for denial, withholding, termination, or
      suspension of Government contract subsequent to acceptance by
      Government of affirmative action plan of employer; time of
      acceptance of plan

      No Government contract, or portion thereof, with any employer,
    shall be denied, withheld, terminated, or suspended, by any agency
    or officer of the United States under any equal employment
    opportunity law or order, where such employer has an affirmative
    action plan which has previously been accepted by the Government
    for the same facility within the past twelve months without first
    according such employer full hearing and adjudication under the
    provisions of section 554 of title 5, and the following pertinent
    sections: Provided, That if such employer has deviated
    substantially from such previously agreed to affirmative action
    plan, this section shall not apply: Provided further, That for the
    purposes of this section an affirmative action plan shall be deemed
    to have been accepted by the Government at the time the appropriate
    compliance agency has accepted such plan unless within forty-five
    days thereafter the Office of Federal Contract Compliance has
    disapproved such plan.

N. A. A. C. P. v. BUTTON (1963)

371 U.S. 415

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE v.
BUTTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA. No. 5.
Argued November 8, 1961. Restored to the calendar for reargument April 2, 1962. Reargued October 9, 1962.
Decided January 14, 1963.

1. Petitioner sued in a Federal District Court to enjoin enforcement of a Virginia statute on the ground that, as applied to it, the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court abstained from passing on the validity of the statute pending an authoritative interpretation of it by the state courts; but it retained jurisdiction. Petitioner then applied to a state court for a binding adjudication of all of its claims and a permanent injunction and declaratory relief, and it made no reservation to the disposition of the entire case by the state courts. A state trial court held the statute to be both constitutional and applicable to petitioner, and this decision was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Petitioner then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and this Court granted certiorari. Held: The District Court’s reservation of jurisdiction was purely formal; it did not impair the jurisdiction of this Court to review an otherwise final state court judgment; the judgment below was “final,” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1257; and the case is properly before this Court. Pp. 427-428.

2. Chapter 33 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, Extra Sess. 1956, amended former statutes defining and punishing malpractice by attorneys so as to broaden the definition of solicitation of legal business to include acceptance of employment or compensation from any person or organization not a party to a judicial proceeding and having no pecuniary right or liability in it. It also made it an offense for any such person or organization to solicit business for any attorney. Petitioner, a corporation whose major purpose was the elimination of racial discrimination, sued in a state court to enjoin enforcement of this Chapter and for a declaratory judgment [371 U.S. 415, 416] that, as applied to petitioner, its affiliates, officers, members, attorneys retained or paid by it, and litigants to whom it might give assistance in cases involving racial discrimination, the Chapter violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found that petitioner, through its State Conference, had formed a legal staff to direct actions pertaining to racial discrimination; urged the institution of suits to challenge racial discrimination; offered the services of attorneys selected and paid by it and its affiliates; and, with its affiliates, controlled the conduct of such litigation. Held: The activities of petitioner, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal business violative of Chapter 33 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Pp. 417-445.

(a) Although petitioner is a corporation, it may assert its right and that of its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringement of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. P. 428.(b) Abstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. P. 429.(c) In the context of petitioner’s objectives, litigation is not a means of resolving private differences; it is a form of political expression and a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all governments, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community. Pp. 429-430.(d) In order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, it is not necessary to subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly, for there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. Pp. 430-431.(e) Under Chapter 33, as authoritatively construed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, a person who advises another that his legal rights have been infringed and refers him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys for assistance has committed a crime, as has the attorney who knowingly renders assistance under such circumstances; there thus inheres in the statute the gravest danger of smothering all discussion looking to the eventual institution of [371 U.S. 415, 417] litigation on behalf of the rights of Negroes; and, as so construed, Chapter 33 violates the Fourteenth Amendment by unduly inhibiting protected freedoms of expression and association. Pp. 431-438.(f) It is no answer to the constitutional claims asserted by petitioner to say, as did the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, that the purpose of this statute was merely to insure high professional standards and not to curtail freedom of expression, for a State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights. Pp. 438-439.(g) However valid may be Virginia’s interest in regulating the traditionally illegal practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty, that interest does not justify the prohibition of petitioner’s activities disclosed by this record. Pp. 439-443.(h) Resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely private gain. Pp. 443-444.(i) Although petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall within the protection of the First Amendment, the State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from petitioner’s activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed. P. 444.

202 Va. 142, 116 S. E. 2d 55, reversed.

Robert L. Carter reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Frank D. Reeves.

Henry T. Wickham reargued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was David J. Mays.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case originated in companion suits by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. (NAACP), and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (Defense Fund), brought in 1957 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The suits sought to restrain the enforcement of Chapters 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, 1956 Extra Session, on the ground that the [371 U.S. 415, 418]statutes, as applied to the activities of the plaintiffs, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge court convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281, after hearing evidence and making fact-findings, struck down Chapters 31, 32 and 35 but abstained from passing upon the validity of Chapters 33 and 36 pending an authoritative interpretation of these statutes by the Virginia courts. The complainants thereupon petitioned in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond to declare Chapters 33 and 36 inapplicable to their activities, or, if applicable, unconstitutional. The record in the Circuit Court was that made before the three-judge court supplemented by additional evidence. The Circuit Court held the chapters to be both applicable and constitutional. The holding was sustained by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as to Chapter 33, but reversed as to Chapter 36, which was held unconstitutional under both state and federal law. Thereupon the Defense Fund returned to the Federal District Court, where its case is presently pending, while the NAACP filed the instant petition. We granted certiorari [365 U.S. 842]. We heard argument in the 1961 Term [371 U.S. 415, 419] and ordered reargument this Term. [369 U.S. 833]. Since no cross-petition was filed to review the Supreme Court of Appeals’ disposition of Chapter 36, the only issue before us is the constitutionality of Chapter 33 as applied to the activities of the NAACP.

There is no substantial dispute as to the facts; the dispute centers about the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of Chapter 33, as construed and applied by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to include NAACP’s activities within the statute’s ban against “the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business.”

The NAACP was formed in 1909 and incorporated under New York law as a nonprofit membership corporation in 1911. It maintains its headquarters in New York and presently has some 1,000 active unincorporated branches throughout the Nation. The corporation is licensed to do business in Virginia, and has 89 branches there. The Virginia branches are organized into the Virginia State Conference of NAACP Branches (the Conference), an unincorporated association, which in 1957 had some 13,500 members. The activities of the Conference are financed jointly by the national organization and the local branches from contributions and membership dues. NAACP policy, binding upon local branches and conferences, is set by the annual national convention.

The basic aims and purposes of NAACP are to secure the elimination of all racial barriers which deprive Negro citizens of the privileges and burdens of equal citizenship rights in the United States. To this end the Association engages in extensive educational and lobbying activities. It also devotes much of its funds and energies to an extensive [371 U.S. 415, 420] program of assisting certain kinds of litigation on behalf of its declared purposes. For more than 10 years, the Virginia Conference has concentrated upon financing litigation aimed at ending racial segregation in the public schools of the Commonwealth.

The Conference ordinarily will finance only cases in which the assisted litigant retains an NAACP staff lawyer to represent him. The Conference maintains a legal staff of 15 attorneys, all of whom are Negroes and members of the NAACP. The staff is elected at the Conference’s annual convention. Each legal staff member must agree to abide by the policies of the NAACP, which, insofar as they pertain to professional services, limit the kinds of litigation which the NAACP will assist. Thus the NAACP will not underwrite ordinary damages actions, criminal actions in which the defendant raises no question of possible racial discrimination, or suits in which the plaintiff seeks separate but equal rather than fully desegregated public school facilities. The staff decides whether a litigant, who may or may not be an NAACP member, is entitled to NAACP assistance. The Conference defrays all expenses of litigation in an assisted case, and usually, although not always, pays each lawyer on the case a per diem fee not to exceed $60, plus out-of-pocket expenses. The assisted litigant receives no money from the Conference or the staff lawyers. The staff member may not accept, from the litigant or any other source, any other compensation for his services in an NAACP-assisted case. None of the staff receives a salary or retainer from the NAACP; the per diem fee is paid only for professional services in a particular case. This per diem payment is [371 U.S. 415, 421] smaller than the compensation ordinarily received for equivalent private professional work. The actual conduct of assisted litigation is under the control of the attorney, although the NAACP continues to be concerned that the outcome of the lawsuit should be consistent with NAACP’s policies already described. A client is free at any time to withdraw from an action.

The members of the legal staff of the Virginia Conference and other NAACP or Defense Fund lawyers called in by the staff to assist are drawn into litigation in various ways. One is for an aggrieved Negro to apply directly to the Conference or the legal staff for assistance. His application is referred to the Chairman of the legal staff. The Chairman, with the concurrence of the President of the Conference, is authorized to agree to give legal assistance in an appropriate case. In litigation involving public school segregation, the procedure tends to be different. Typically, a local NAACP branch will invite a member of the legal staff to explain to a meeting of parents and children the legal steps necessary to achieve desegregation. The staff member will bring printed forms to the meeting authorizing him, and other NAACP or Defense Fund attorneys of his designation, to represent the signers in legal proceedings to achieve desegregation. On occasion, blank forms have been signed by litigants, upon the understanding that a member or members of the legal staff, with or without assistance from other NAACP lawyers, or from the Defense Fund, would handle the case. It is usual, after obtaining authorizations, for the staff lawyer to bring into the case the other staff members in the area where suit is to be brought, and sometimes to bring in lawyers from the national organization or the Defense Fund. In effect, then, the prospective [371 U.S. 415, 422] litigant retains not so much a particular attorney as the “firm” of NAACP and Defense Fund lawyers, which has a corporate reputation for expertness in presenting and arguing the difficult questions of law that frequently arise in civil rights litigation.

These meetings are sometimes prompted by letters and bulletins from the Conference urging active steps to fight segregation. The Conference has on occasion distributed to the local branches petitions for desegregation to be signed by parents and filed with local school boards, and advised branch officials to obtain, as petitioners, persons willing to “go all the way” in any possible litigation that may ensue. While the Conference in these ways encourages the bringing of lawsuits, the plaintiffs in particular actions, so far as appears, make their own decisions to become such.[371 U.S. 415, 423]

Statutory regulation of unethical and nonprofessional conduct by attorneys has been in force in Virginia since 1849. These provisions outlaw, inter alia, solicitation of legal business in the form of “running” or “capping.” Prior to 1956, however, no attempt was made to proscribe under such regulations the activities of the NAACP, which had been carried on openly for many years in substantially the manner described. In 1956, however, the legislature amended, by the addition of Chapter 33, the provisions of the Virginia Code forbidding solicitation of legal business by a “runner” or “capper” to include, in the definition of “runner” or “capper,” an agent for an individual or organization which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability. [371 U.S. 415, 424] The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the chapter’s purpose “was to strengthen the existing statutes to further control the evils of solicitation of legal business . . . .” 202 Va., at 154, 116 S. E. 2d, at 65. The [371 U.S. 415, 425] court held that the activities of NAACP, the Virginia Conference, the Defense Fund, and the lawyers furnished by them, fell within, and could constitutionally be proscribed by, the chapter’s expanded definition of improper solicitation of legal business, and also violated Canons 35 and 47 of the American Bar Association’s Canons of Professional Ethics, which the court had [371 U.S. 415, 426] adopted in 1938. Specifically the court held that, under the expanded definition, such activities on the part of NAACP, the Virginia Conference, and the Defense Fund constituted “fomenting and soliciting legal business in which they are not parties and have no pecuniary right or liability, and which they channel to the enrichment of certain lawyers employed by them, at no cost to the litigants and over which the litigants have no control.” 202 Va., at 155; 116 S. E. 2d, at 66. Finally, the court restated the decree of the Richmond Circuit Court. We have excerpted the pertinent portion of the court’s holding in the margin. [371 U.S. 415, 427]

I.

A jurisdictional question must first be resolved: whether the judgment below was “final” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1257. The three-judge Federal District Court retained jurisdiction of this case while an authoritative construction of Chapters 33 and 36 was being sought in the Virginia courts Cf. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 173. The question of our jurisdiction arises because, when the case was last here, we observed that such abstention to secure state court interpretation “does not, of course, involve the abdication [by the District Court] of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise . . . .” Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177. We meant simply that the District Court had properly retained jurisdiction, since a party has the right to return to the District Court, after obtaining the authoritative state court construction for which the court abstained, for a final determination of his claim. Where, however, the party remitted to the state courts elects to seek a complete and final adjudication of his rights in the state courts, the District Court’s reservation of jurisdiction is purely formal, and does not impair our jurisdiction to review directly an otherwise final state court judgment. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45. We think it clear that petitioner made such an [371 U.S. 415, 428] election in the instant case, by seeking from the Richmond Circuit Court “a binding adjudication” of all its claims and a permanent injunction as well as declaratory relief, by making no reservation to the disposition of the entire case by the state courts, and by coming here directly on certiorari. Therefore, the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was final, and the case is properly before us.

II.

Petitioner challenges the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals on many grounds. But we reach only one: that Chapter 33 as construed and applied abridges the freedoms of the First Amendment, protected against state action by the Fourteenth. More specifically, petitioner claims that the chapter infringes the right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights. We think petitioner may assert this right on its own behalf, because, though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities, claimed to be constitutionally protected, which the statute would curtail. Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233. We also think petitioner has standing to assert the corresponding rights of its members. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-460; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523, n. 9; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296.

We reverse the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association protected by the First and [371 U.S. 415, 429] Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal business violative of Chapter 33 and the Canons of Professional Ethics.

A.

We meet at the outset the contention that “solicitation” is wholly outside the area of freedoms protected by the First Amendment. To this contention there are two answers. The first is that a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels. The second is that abstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259-264. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4. In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts. Just as it was true of the [371 U.S. 415, 430] opponents of New Deal legislation during the 1930’s, for example, no less is it true of the Negro minority today. And under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.

We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. Thus we have affirmed the right “to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.” NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 460. We have deemed privileged, under certain circumstances, the efforts of a union official to organize workers. Thomas v. Collins, supra. We have said that the Sherman Act does not apply to certain concerted activities of railroads “at least insofar as those activities comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws” because “such a construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions,” specifically, First Amendment questions. Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 65 U.S. 127, [371 U.S. 415, 431]138. And we have refused to countenance compelled disclosure of a person’s political associations in language closely applicable to the instant case:

“Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations. Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents. All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the programs of our two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups . . . .” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-251 (plurality opinion). Cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-366.

The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but the litigation it assists, while serving to vindicate the legal rights of members of the American Negro community, at the same time and perhaps more importantly, makes possible the distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society. For such a group, association for litigation may be the most effective form of political association.

B.

Our concern is with the impact of enforcement of Chapter 33 upon First Amendment freedoms. We start, of course, from the decree of the Supreme Court of Appeals. Although the action before it was one basically for declaratory relief, that court not only expounded the purpose and reach of the chapter but held concretely that certain of petitioner’s activities had, and certain others had not, [371 U.S. 415, 432] violated the chapter. These activities had been explored in detail at the trial and were spread out plainly on the record. We have no doubt that the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals in the instant case was intended as a full and authoritative construction of Chapter 33 as applied in a detailed factual context. That construction binds us. For us, the words of Virginia’s highest court are the words of the statute. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 317. We are not left to speculate at large upon the possible implications of bare statutory language.

But it does not follow that this Court now has only a clear-cut task to decide whether the activities of the petitioner deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court of Appeals are constitutionally privileged. If the line drawn by the decree between the permitted and prohibited activities of the NAACP, its members and lawyers is an ambiguous one, we will not presume that the statute curtails constitutionally protected activity as little as possible. For standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-510, 517-518; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359; United States v. C. I. O.,335 U.S. 106, 142 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Furthermore, the instant decree may be invalid if it prohibits privileged exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct. For in appraising a statute’s inhibitory effect upon such rights, this Court has not hesitated to take into account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that at bar. Thornhill v. Alabama,310 U.S. 88, 97-98; Winters v. New York, supra, at 518-520. Cf. Staub v. City of Baxley,355 U.S. 313. It makes no difference that the instant case was not a criminal prosecution and not based on a refusal to comply with a licensing requirement. The [371 U.S. 415, 433] objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 733. These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions. Cf. Smith v. California, supra, at 151-154; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311.

[371 U.S. 415, 434]

“Attitudes in Mississippi” by Erle Johnston, Jr., december 1967

http://anna.lib.usm.edu/~spcol/crda/johnston/eej057.html

Interview with Honorable Charles Evers : mayor of Fayette, Mississippi(Medgar Evers’s brother), December 3, 1971

http://cdm.lib.usm.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/coh&CISOPTR=2241&REC=8

Affidavits about events in the summer of 1964, Collected by Mississippi Freedom Project

http://anna.lib.usm.edu/~spcol/crda/ellin/ellin061.html

Mississippi : image and reality; a report for or by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), March 1965

http://cdm.lib.usm.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/manu&CISOPTR=3755&REC=10

Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890–1934

http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/lhr/20.2/novkov.html

Rosenwald Schools

Here is some interesting information and some photos of the schools, like Lincoln School in Mount Olive, that were funded in part by Julius Rosenwald.

http://www.preservationnation.org/travel-and-sites/sites/southern-region/rosenwald-schools/

Murder In Mississippi – The assassination of Medgar Evers